Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

3-2006

A Market Reaction to DoD Contact Delay
Robert D. Carden

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Government Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Carden, Robert D., "A Market Reaction to DoD Contact Delay" (2006). Theses and Dissertations. 3308.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3308

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

A MARKET REACTION TO DOD CONTRACT DELAY
THESIS
Robert D. Carden, Captain, USAF
AFIT/ENV/GRD/06M-02

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United States
Government.

AFIT/GRD/ENV/06M-02

A MARKET REACTION TO DOD CONTRACT DELAY
THESIS
Presented to the Faculty
Department of Systems and Engineering Management
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management

Robert D. Carden, BS
Captain, USAF

March 2006

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

AFIT/GRD/ENV/06M-02

A MARKET REACTION TO DOD CONTRACT DELAY
Robert D. Carden, BS
Captain, USAF

Approved:

__________/signed/____________________
Sonia E. Leach, (Co-Chair)

7 March 2006
date

__________/signed/____________________
Jeffrey S. Smith, (Co-Chair)

7 March 2006
date

__________/signed/____________________
Michael J. Hicks, (Member)

7 March 2006
date

__________/signed/____________________
Michael T. Rehg, (Member)

7 March 2006
date

AFIT/GRD/ENV/06M-02

Abstract
Development projects are occurring at a faster rate in the civilian world than for the
Department of Defense (DoD). In the civilian world, faster development means quicker delivery
and sales. In the DoD, quicker product development equates to a more capable warfighter. On
average, DoD Acquisition Category One (ACAT I) development projects are approaching a 15
year procurement cycle. In the last three years, acquisition cycle time has grown nearly 20
percent. It turns out that the very companies that have learned to be faster, leaner and more
effective in their civilian endeavors do not seem to be functioning the same on their DoD
contracts. The impact to the tax payer, the warfighter and national security are the impetus for
this research. This research examines the heretofore uninvestigated relationship between DoD
delay and its impact on shareholder wealth. The results show positive generation of significant
wealth for shareholders at the announcement of a DoD delay. This finding indicates a possible
systemic incentive for the observed delays. At the very least, the generation of significant wealth
for the owners of the firm does not dissuade firms from delay.
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A MARKET REACTION TO DOD CONTRACT DELAY

Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past 40 years, there has been a steady increase in the time it takes an acquisition
program to produce a weapon system for the warfighter. McNutt (1998) described the magnitude
of this problem by considering the history of acquisition cycle time of acquisition category I
(ACAT I) programs. The data showed that in 1965, the average ACAT I program took 60
months (McNutt, 1998). By 1994, the average ACAT I program had extended to over 108
months (McNutt, 1998). In 1986 the Packard Commission warned of unreasonably long
acquisition cycles, ten to fifteen years, as having negative impact on national security. The
RAND Corporation performed the study An Analysis of Weapon System Cost Growth in 1993,
and found that the trend had not diminished (Drezner, Jarvaise, Hess, Hough, & Norton, 1993).
The most up-to-date reviews of large weapon system acquisitions are accomplished
annually by the Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2003, 2004, 2005). The GAO defines
acquisition cycle time from the point of approval to initial operating capability (IOC). Delay is
defined as an extension to the originally predicted cycle time. For standardization these
definitions have been adopted for this research. In 2005, the GAO found that over the last three
years, programs have increased their cycle time from 147 to 175 months, nearly 20 percent.
Figure 1 shows that McNutt’s predicted growth in cycle for 2000-2004 falls well short of the
actual GAO data reported in 2005. Table 1 summarizes the cost and schedule growth of
programs reviewed by GAO.
1
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Figure 1. Comparison of Growth: McNutt (1998) prediction vs. GAO (2005) findings

.
Table 1. Growth of the 26 Continuous Programs in the GAO (2005) Study

Total Cost
RDT&E Cost
Acquisition Cycle Time

2003
2005 % Change
$479.60 $548.90
14.5
$102.00 $144.70
41.9
146.6 mo 175.3 mo
19.6

The Problem
The companies identified as having the largest cycle time growth, or delay, on DoD
contracts, have also been lauded for their ability to develop and deliver products to their
commercial customers faster, better, cheaper. Boeing, Pratt and Whitney (P&W), and Northrop
Grumman have all been cited as industry examples for cycle time improvement but exhibit
dichotomous behavior on their DoD work. For example, Boeing designed and built the 777 in six
years, yet it took nearly 20 years to build the C-17 (Battershell, 1999). P&W’s commercial
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engine division reduced cost by 35 percent and production time from eighteen to six months for
airline industry customers (Womack & Jones, 1996). P&W also designed, built, and entered full
rate production of the GP7200 engine for the A380 Airbus in less than 5 years (P&W, 2005).
The engines for the F-22 developed by P&W at the same facility, however took more than 12
years for the development phase (Global Security. org, 2005; “Aeropropulsion Testing”, 1996).
Motivation
This research investigates a possible motivation for this behavior by examining the
relationship between DoD contractual delay and the stock price of the company using event
study methodology. The motivation for this research is twofold. At the most basic level, the
taxpayers bear the burden for an extended acquisition process. It is reasonable for taxpayers to
have an expectation that these companies should perform similarly in their government contracts
as they do in their civilian programs. It is also reasonable for the warfighter to expect a product
that provides the required capability in a time frame relevant to the threats. Defense acquisition
professionals have voiced concerns at the highest levels. Paul Kaminski, Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, summed up the issue in 1995 when he addressed the
Senate:
The Department of Defense cannot afford a 15-year acquisition cycle time when the
comparable commercial turnover is every 3 to 4 years. The issue is not only cost. The lives of
our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen may depend upon shortened acquisition cycle times
as well. In a global market, everyone, including our potential adversaries, will gain
increasing access to the same commercial technology base. The military advantage goes to
the nation who has the best cycle time.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this research is that there is a significant market reaction to delay that
is represented in the market returns on given companies stock. By viewing this relationship in
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terms of the open market, it may be possible to identify systemic motivators that may contribute
to extended cycle times on DoD contracts. By examining the corresponding market reaction to
an announced contract delay, the valuation of the event by the stockholders can be examined.
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Chapter 2
The Realm of Research Conducted
The hypothesis that contract delay does or does not impact stock prices contains several
supporting topics that must be investigated to gain a full understanding of the topic at hand. A
review of current cycle time and production literature, contracting, and event study methodology
must be performed to allow development of a methodology and empirical test of the hypothesis.
Cycle Time: Identification of the Problem
Research accomplished by the two American leading cycle time and production schools,
MIT’s Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) and Harvard’s Business Process Reengineering (BPR),
provides an outstanding resource of success stories of companies in the civilian sector.
Comparison of their reported outstanding civilian behavior to the negative behavior identified in
GAO reports provided validation that a problem actually exists.
The trend in civilian cycle times in many industries is getting shorter and shorter.
According to Wheelwright and Clark (1992), auto manufacturers, electronics firms, furniture
makers, and aircraft manufacturers have all moved towards shorter production cycles.
Wheelwright, similar to the GAO, defines the production cycle as the time it takes to design,
develop and produce a new product for the customer (1992). Wheelwright and Clarks’ assertion
is that for companies to be competitive in a world of faster production cycles, they must reduce
production cycle times. This has been described as a form of commercial Darwinism, where only
the fastest survive (Armstrong, 2002). In their book, Revolutionizing Product Development,
Wheelwright and Clark highlight several industries where companies have been forced to
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respond to faster production cycle times within their markets. This competition within industries
has driven the automobile industry to reduce its production cycle from six years to less than two
(Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). The electronics industry production cycle has dropped from two
years to less than one (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). The commercial aircraft industry has moved
to match Boeings benchmark of six years set with their development and rollout of the 777
(Battershell, 1999).
The issue, and the point of this research, arises when this performance is compared to the
performance of the same companies in their DoD endeavors. P&W is used as an exemplary case
for the civilian work in a case study by Womack and Jones in their book Lean Thinking. Boeing
has received the prestigious Malcolm Baldridge Award for their commercial Aerospace Support
Division (Kosko, 2003). Northrop Grumman has won the prestigious Frost and Sullivan Award
for their delivery of information systems and service (Jones, 2005). Within their DoD contracts
however, these companies have yet to complete a project in the GAO study on their original
schedules. In fact, they have delayed, and in many cases, stopped providing estimates for interim
operating capacity (IOC) to the GAO. The Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS), for
example, has no estimated delivery date after nearly eight years in development (GAO, 2005)
This review categorizes the literature on delay into two points of view: commercial and
government. While the problems these two camps point out are certainly real, non-trivial issues
that may result in delay, they appear to be aimed at the individual processes without considering
any larger systemic issues. There are numerous theories, strategies and solutions aimed at
improving cycle time. Libraries of business improvement methods exist considering things like
management strategy (Clark & Takahiro, 1989, 1991; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992) and
production capacity (Womack & Jones, 1996) or lack thereof, and even contract methodologies
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(Anand & Gutierrez, 2005; Durbin, 1996; Natarajan, Sethuraman, & Surysekar 2005; Segal &
Whinston 2003)
The government has, in many cases, attempted to adapt these theories to fit within the
government system, but as the GAO data shows, program acquisition cycle time is still growing.
Authors who are focused on the DoD side of cycle time point to the bureaucracy and the
requirements for doing business with the government as the issue (Battershell, 1999).
Requirements definition and changes (GAO, 2003) and program management issues (McNutt,
1998; Follmer, 1990; Boyd & Mundt, 1993; Wandlund & Wickman, 1993; Buchfeller, 1994;
GAO, 2005) are implicated as reasons for the current state of the acquisitions cycle time.
While all of these are valid issues, they tend to view the problem from the point of view
of traditional business models and disciplines. While it is clear that a problem exists, researchers,
managers and policy makers appear to be trying to fix the system from within. This strategy has
simply proved ineffective over the last 40 years. Stepping back and looking at the issue from a
system level to identify possible systemic causes of delay has either received little attention or no
one has chosen to publish their work. By looking at the problem from the systems point of view,
at the level where the DoD is the principle and the firm is the agent, potential problems with the
nature of the system can be investigated. While the GAO and others have said that acquisition
cycle time is a problem, a measure of the firms activity with regard to delay should be
developed. The value of the firm by its owner is a good proxy for their perspective. While the
government considers contractual delay a problem, if stock prices react significantly to delay, the
voice of the owners is reflected.
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Contracting: The State of the System
It is impossible to answer any question as to the value of an activity occurring in a DoD
contractual system without a basic understanding of the landscape in which the contractual
relationship occurs. The level at which this research focuses is the market level, where the
system is simplistic in its mechanism and well described in both classic and popular literature.
General Contracts
At the system level, the contract is a problem described by economists and lawyers as the
principle-agent problem. It is an agreement between a principle or buyer, and the agent, or seller,
for a good or service. This relationship is compounded by moral hazard and asymmetric
information (Lafont & Tirole, 1993; Tirole, 2001; McAfee & McMillan, 1988). In this situation,
the agent has information concerning the true cost of production and the principle uses contract
types to screen agents and arrive at the optimal contract (Dewatripont & Maskin, 1995).
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) referred to this view of the relationship as mechanistic, in
which the control of ex-ante information asymmetry is the concern in achieving the optimal
contract. A different view exists and is supported in popular literature approaching the optimal
contract problem from a risk and change point of view. The premise is that asymmetric
information, while possibly present at the start of the contract, is not the prime concern in
obtaining optimal contract type ( Lee, 2001; McAfee & McMillian, 1987; Bajari & Tadelis,
2001). Other authors have identified that in a world of incentive contracts, uncertainty is the
potential prime regulator for optimal contract type and that other mechanisms exist to deal with
asymmetric information once the contract is under way (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001; McAfee &
McMillian, 1987). Uncertainty at the outset, (product design, ultimate cost, regulatory issues,
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funding etc.) may drive lower initial contract costs, but increase the costs through renegotiation
and may provide the agent asymmetric information advantage in the relationship.
Since the focus of this research is weapon system acquisitions, which are deliverable
goods, service contracts will not be mentioned. For this research, only DoD relationships with
publicly traded companies are considered. No effort has been made nor is evidence presented
attempting to investigate whether non-profit or government agencies are experiencing the
observed behavior.
DoD Contracts
Several researchers have cited that the government may choose incentive contracts for
several reasons: ease of management (Lee, 2001), risk aversion by the agent (), ambiguity
aversion by both (Mukerji 2003), and funding constraints (Battershell, 1999).
To understand the principles and guidance presented to contracts agents in the DoD, the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was reviewed. Contract types are described in the FAR
and prescribed primarily according to DoD risk and specificity of the Government requirement.
This approach seeks to prescribe an optimal contract type to an endeavor based on contractor risk
level balanced with cost to the DoD. The two categories of contracts specifically outlined in the
FAR are the Cost Reimbursable (CR) and Fixed Price (FP) type contracts. Within each category
there are variations for a number of different conditions. These two types represent the end
points of the contract continuum. At one end, high risk efforts are generally CR, where DoD risk
in the program is high, the agents profit is relatively low. At the other end of the scale are FP
type contracts, where the DoD’s risk is low and the agent’s potential for profit is high. In
between these two extremes, the FAR identifies the continuum of FP and CR based contracts as
incentive contracts. The incentives are tailored according to risk to fit the program. Incentive
9

contracts may be of either type, CR or FP and their differentiation is the tailoring of the incentive
structures.

FP

Incentive

CP
DOD Risk

Contractor Profit
Figure 2. Contract type: risk vs. profit continuum.

The FAR prescribes the use of pure FP and CR contracts to a very specific set of
conditions which do not lend themselves to weapon systems (FAR, part 16, 2005).
Appropriately, there are very few strictly FP or CP contracts for major weapon systems
acquisition within DoD (FAR, 2005; Bakkila, 1996; GAO, 1987). While there are minor
differences between the two, the method of establishing the total cost and the agent’s profit are
very similar. Incentive type contracts use the agent’s fair and reasonable estimate of the cost and
then apply a formula or rate to determine profit or fee for the agent (FAR part16, 2005). The
incentives used by the DoD are classified as cost, schedule or performance (FAR 16.402, 2005).
A cost incentive is intended to motivate the agent to maximize cost control methods or minimize
cost growth cost saving measures through the possibility of sharing in the cost savings (FAR
16.402.1, 2005). Schedule incentives provide a premium to the agent if schedule expectations are
exceeded (FAR 16.402.3, 2005). Performance incentives provide the agent the ability to increase
profit based on exceeding the minimum performance requirements of the contract (FAR
16.402.2, 2005).
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Constraints on the DoD Contractor Relationship
While the GAO has shown that incentive contracts are somewhat effective, contracting
under incentive methodology bears little on the ultimate performance of the contract once let
(GAO, 1987). This is due to the landscape for government contracting being dominated by a lack
of defined quality (Lee, 2001; Bajari & Tadelis, 2001) and Congressional Budget Authority
(Title 31, US Code 1301). The term quality used in the popular contracting literature is not used
as a damnation of products procured, but is simply a description of a system that enters a
contractual agreement without the specifications of the product fully agreed to. This is the very
nature of weapons system acquisition where products are actually developed during the
acquisition program. The second factor, Congressional Budget Authority, is derived from the
Constitution and is enforced by the Anti-deficiency Act, Title 31, US Code 1301 which states:
(1) An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of
Columbia government may not—
(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in
an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation;
(B) involve either government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money
before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law;
(C) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation of funds required to be
sequestered under section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985; or
(D) involve either government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money
required to be sequestered under section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985.
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The impact of the Anti-deficiency Act is that when Congressional appropriations are
reduced, the programs’ budget in the given year is also reduced. This leads to the conditions
precisely spelled out by Lee (2001), where he identifies the issue based on information and
commitment. The principle therefore cannot commit to a price since Congressional budget is not
a fixed quantity and may be altered. The agent cannot commit to the quality of the product,
specs, type, quantity and or performance, because they are subject to change as the procurement
develops. The system essentially comprises a series of continually renegotiated contracts. Lee
(2001) points out that as each of these de-facto short term contracts are renegotiated, the base
price upon which profit is calculated, increases. Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) termed this upward
escalation and reluctance to terminate government contracts as the “ratchet effect.” In their
description of the phenomenon, the motivation for continuance was reluctance to admit failure,
difficulty in re-allocating funds and budgetary constraints of approval for any new contract.
Commensurate with Guesnerie, Tirole and Lee’s theories, the contract, once let, tends to have a
life of its own. The government commits to short term dollars and the contractor commits to
achievable quality within that limit and expends a commensurate amount of effort.
The Impact
The impact of this ongoing situation is that as changes occur, the contract is modified. In
this environment, modifications of the budget or quality are reflected in the ultimate price or fee
structure of the contract. Total price, or ceiling, is relevant to the question of profit when the
price is reasonably based on equivalency of information between the agent and the principle
(GAO, 1987). The total cost is now a function of effort expended within the allocated budget,
regardless of initial contract type. The C-17, F-22, and F-35 all experienced delays which
extended the period of performance, essentially providing a longer expectation of revenue for the
12

firm. The agents, potentially aware of the situation and generally risk averse are willing to take
the smaller profit margins at the outset of the contract with the knowledge that in all likelihood, it
will extend.
Event Studies: Empirical Analysis of the Current State
To develop a methodology to quantitatively assess the impact of contractual delay on the
firm, event study literature was reviewed. This area of economics is well documented and
methods for conducting event studies have been tested extensively. Fama, Fischer, Jensen, and
Roll laid the foundations of this methodology in their 1969 International Economic Review
article The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information. Brown and Warner’s 1980 paper
presented in the Journal of Economics, Measuring Security Price Performance, tests, updates the
methodology, and identifies the power of applicable models. Their later work in the 1984 Journal
of Financial Economics Article, Using Daily Stock Returns, The Case of Event Studies, further
validated the methodology and its use in the evaluation of daily stock returns for event studies.
Review of the state and evolving applications of the event study as an empirical tool was
also performed. This review finds a large number of authors using the methodology to assess the
impact of events on firms in areas such as intellectual property (Pearsall, 2002), and brand value
(Mitchell, 1989). Major events have also been evaluated using the methodology: airline crashes
(Chalk, 1987; Chance & Ferris, 1987); news announcements (Campbell, Andrew, & MacKinlay,
1996); corporate malfeasance (Bizjak & Coles, 1995; Bosch & Woodrow, 1991); and lawsuits
(Bhagat, Bizjak, & Coles, 1998). Development and guidance of the specific methodology used in
this research was also influenced by the work of Small and Jeff (2006) in their working paper,
The Hot Stock Tip from Debbie: Implications for Market Efficiency.
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Event study methodology was developed to test market efficiency and therefore cannot
be divorced from it, or used without at least a basic understanding of market efficiency and its
implications. Any review would not be complete without considering Eugene Fama’s work
substantiating market efficiencies (Fama, 1969, 1970, 1991, 1998). Market efficiency is
described as the relationship between information and share prices in capital markets and the
speed at which those markets reflect the information (Poshakwale, 1996). Fama categorized the
efficiency of capital markets based on the relationship of information and stock price. In his
work, Fama describes the weak efficiency relationship as one where the current price of a
security fully reflects all the information contained in the historical prices of the security. A semi
strong relationship is one where security prices instantaneously reflect new publicly available
information. Finally, the strong relationship is one where information, public or private, is
reflected in the stock price. The implication of this information-price relationship is that in an
efficient market, prices of securities reflect the expected returns and risks based on the
information that is known. Based on the efficient market theory, the ability to identify and earn
higher than expected returns on undervalued securities, given their level of risk, is removed.
Inefficient markets, on the other hand, would allow the ability to choose a security that could
provide returns higher than that which is commensurate with the securities risk.
The assumption that markets are efficient allows the event study methodology to be
useful. Market efficiency allows the development of models to measure the impact of an event
on the firms affected. Brown and Warner’s (1980, 1984) tests of various models on daily and
monthly returns provide researchers a range of tools to assess the impact of an event on the
returns of a firm. Brown and Warner (1984) showed that the common models (returns, mean
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adjusted returns, market adjusted returns and the market model) were all shown to be comparable
in their ability to accurately identify the impact of an event on the stock.
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Chapter 3
The hypothesis of this research is that DoD contractual delay significantly impacts the
wealth of shareholders. Event study methodology provides a tool for the formation of the
empirical test and hypothesis. Event studies estimate the abnormal returns (AR) associated with a
distinct market event and compare them to the actual realized returns (R) of a firm (i) at the time
of the event (t). This comparison allows a researcher to evaluate the impact of the event on the
value of the stock. The hypothesis to test the theory that delay on government contracts has an
impact on the value of the firm to the stockholders is:
Ho: Contract delay does not significantly impact the returns of the firm,
(ARit=0t)
Ha: Contract delay significantly impacts the returns of the firm,
(ARit≠0t)
Event studies utilize analysis of two periods of time to assess the impact of an event on
the firm’s returns (Fama et al, 1969). To do this, a period prior to the event, referred to as the
estimation period, is used to estimate the relationship between a firms returns and the market.
This relationship is used to estimate the normal returns of the firm surrounding the event,
referred to as the event period. The Market Adjusted Returns model used in this research,
estimates the event period returns with regards to the market at large without the event. Utilizing
some applicable market benchmark such as the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, or
the Russell 3000, a researcher is able to perform a regression that estimates the relationship
between the market and the return of the firm in question. In utilizing the market returns model,
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the variance that is related to the greater market is reduced in the estimation of normal returns.
The general market returns model utilized in the current literature is given in Equation (1):
R it = α i + β i Rmt

(1)

where,

R it is the return for a given stock (i) at a specified time (t)
Rmt is the return for the given market index (m) at a specified time (t)

Regression is used to estimate the αi and ,βi parameters with the chosen market index as
the independent variable and the firm’s returns as the dependant variables. In doing so, normal
post event returns (Rit) post event can be estimated to establish what normal returns would have
been had the event had not occurred.
To determine if the actual post event returns are truly significant, they must be compared
to the estimates of normal returns. This is done utilizing Equation (2),
ARit = Rit − (α i + β i Rmt )

(2)

where,
ARit is the abnormal return at a specified time (t)
Rit is the actual return of the given stock at the specified time (t)

α i + β i Rmt is the expected normal return with regard to the market returns at a
specified time (t)
To test the null hypothesis, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are summed for the
post event period and tested to determine significance. Since theory predicts that in rational and
efficient markets CARs ultimately sum to zero over time, any values significantly different from
zero during the post event period are indicative of the events impact. Equation (3) determines the
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significance of the abnormal return by dividing it by the estimated standard deviation. To
calculate that significance value Equations (4), (5) and (6) are utilized to calculate average car
for the event period, standard deviation for the observation period and average abnormal return
for the observation period.
)
At / S ( At )

(3)

where,

1
At =
Nt

Nt

∑A
i =1

(4)

i ,t

(

)

2
⎛ t =−30
⎞
−
A
A
∑
⎜
⎟
)
⎠
S ( At ) = ⎝ t =−210
180

A=

1 t =−30
∑ At
181 t =−210

(5)

(6)

While the methodology of an event study is mainly prescribed, there are several factors
and considerations that must be taken into account when attempting its application, such as firm
selection criteria, event determination, stock and index information and model parameters.
Determine the Selection Criteria of a Firm
For this research, the firms of Boeing traded, in the New York Stock exchange as BA,
and Sikorsky, traded as UTX, were chosen from the list of those performing as prime contractors
on ACAT I programs. United Technologies stock information was utilized since Sikorsky is a
wholly owned subsidiary. The program chosen was the Comanche Helicopter for the availability
of data and the ability to definitively identify its delay event. This event provides a unique
opportunity to test the hypothesis since the impact of the same event can be studied with regard
to the separate companies.
18

Determine the Event
The hypothesis that government contract delay influences stock price identifies the type
of event to capture. In the current literature, publicly released information concerning a specific
event is utilized to establish the event date in regards to a given firm. Publicly released
information containing specific information about contract delay within the chosen acquisition
program was compiled to determine the specific event horizon and allow testing using the
prescribed analysis. Securities and Exchange Commission filings, newswire releases, journals,
and non-classified government reports were used, since all are readily available to the general
investor and published within a relevant time frame to the event. The delay chosen was the 18
April 2002 announcement by the Department of the Army that the period of performance (POP)
for the Comanche Program was extended by five years.
Collect the Stock and Index Information for Analysis
For this study, the Daily Market Adjusted Returns model was used as specified by Brown
and Warner (1984) to ensure that any resulting abnormal returns are event driven and not simply
an effect of the larger market. The S&P 500 was chosen as the representative index for the larger
market since Boeing and United Technologies are both listed in that index. All stock and S&P
500 data was gathered from the Yahoo!Finances database. The range of data gathered for the
analysis was for 210 days prior to the event, 12 June 2001, to 21 days after the event, 17 May
2002. The closing price for each company and the index for each day were collected.
Run the Model
The data was downloaded into Microsoft Excel and daily returns were calculated for the
S&P index, Boeing and UTX. The regression for the estimation of α and β was based on 181
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samples, taken 30 days prior to the event horizon (n=181, (t-30)-(t-210)). The observation period
of 180 days was chosen because it represents two business quarters of data and falls within the
periods previously used in popular event studies. The time frame chosen for analysis of CARs
varies highly within the literature as well as rational for the chosen length of the period. This
research, undertaken as a case study, seeks to identify trends over time relevant to the delay
event, so a rather lengthy daily returns event window was chosen. While 21 days is not
unprecedented, it is at the high end of daily driven event studies. Popular news was checked for
the dates within the event window to ensure that other events where not impacting the results of
the study. This review showed a lack of news reported for either company that would have
influenced the results of the event. While other authors use a large range of estimation periods,
Brown and Warner identified that the period of observation for the regression made little
difference in the power of the Market Adjusted Returns model (1984).
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Chapter 4
The methodology previously described was used to identify abnormal returns for both
Boeing and Sikorsky from the announcement of the delay 18 April 2002, to the end of the chosen
event period, 17 May 2002. Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the regression
variables for each company.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Boeing and United
Technologies Regressions

Dependant Variable
Independent Variable
Estimate of α
Estimate of β
R2
Standard Error

BA
S&P 500
-0.001
1.412
0.367
0.022

UTX
S&P 500
0.001
1.616
0.427
0.023

The regressions resulted in a high R2 value, with similar studies reporting between .19
and .4 (Bhagat, Bizjak & Coles, 1998; Pearsall, 2002). This can be explained by the use of an
index in which the dependent variables stocks also traded. The research literature has a wide
range of R2 values from as low as .19 to as high as .80 for indexes created for their specific
studies. The estimates of α and β are also similar in value to those found in the literature.
Table 3 shows the abnormal returns of the event period summed to provide cumulative
abnormal returns. The cumulative abnormal returns tested for significance using Equation (3).
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Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Significance for Boeing and
United Technologies
ET
Date
BA CAR
T-Stat
UTX CAR
0 18-Apr-02
-0.034
-1.534
-0.035
1 19-Apr-02
-0.056
-2.523**
-0.011
2 22-Apr-02
-0.025
-1.117
0.025
3 23-Apr-02
-0.031
-1.366
0.027
4 24-Apr-02
-0.022
-0.099
0.026
5 25-Apr-02
-0.031
-1.407
0.038
6 26-Apr-02
-0.021
-0.923
0.048
7 29-Apr-02
0.045
2.026**
0.057
8 30-Apr-02
0.053
2.364**
0.073
9
1-May-02
0.061
2.731**
0.064
10
2-May-02
0.050
2.245**
0.051
11
3-May-02
0.060
2.678**
0.068
12
6-May-02
0.060
2.67**
0.066
13
7-May-02
0.059
2.637**
0.082
14
8-May-02
0.036
1.608*
0.052
15
9-May-02
0.070
3.125**
0.064
16 10-May-02
0.064
2.867**
0.080
17 13-May-02
0.053
2.385**
0.061
18 14-May-02
0.051
2.285**
0.045
19 15-May-02
0.039
1.751*
0.047
20 16-May-02
0.040
1.812*
0.028
21 17-May-02
0.040
1.772*
0.021
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
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T-Stat
-1.535
-0.496
1.08
1.177
1.138
1.673*
2.123**
2.522**
3.198**
2.815**
2.225**
3.010**
2.900**
3.615***
2.308**
2.812**
3.502***
2.667**
1.989**
2.083**
1.212
0.926

Analysis of the Data
The results of the data reject the null hypothesis for Boeing and United Technologies
showing significant abnormal positive returns on each companies stock. Figure 3 graphically
represents the CARs over the event period for both companies.

Boeing

United Technologies
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Figure 3. Cumulative abnormal returns for Boeing and Untied Technologies.

Following the delay announcement, Boeing experienced a one day, statistically
significant decrease in stock value. A possible explanation of this reaction is that corporate
traders and fund managers trading Boeing stock initially degraded the value of the stock. Neither
company experienced any other statistically significant change to their stock for nearly five days
following the event. This refractory period can be explained by the market digesting the
information and determining its implication on value.
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Figure 4. Summary of wealth creation.

Figure 4 shows the wealth created by the delay at key points of the event period. Included
in Figure 4 are the maximum wealth created, wealth created for the total event period and the
average wealth created as specified by Warner and Brown (1984). Both companies experienced a
positive significant creation of maximum wealth for their shareholders at the announcement of
the delay. At the height of the positive reaction, Boeing experienced $33.8 million and United
Technologies experienced $76.9 million as shown in figure 4. Figure 4 also shows the wealth
creation over the 21 day observation period to be similar for both firms, $19.2 million and $19.7
million respectively.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
DoD contract delay significantly impacts returns of the firm. In this case, the impact is
significantly positive, generating wealth for the shareholders.
Observations and Discussion
This research was conducted for two companies and a single acquisition delay. While it is
in and of itself non-conclusive as to the state of DoD acquisitions as a whole, it does provide a
positive indication that an issue exists. To understand the ramifications of this issue, it must be
studied further. While policy implications from these findings can only be speculative at this
point, a broader study could lead to significant policy changes in the way the DoD acquires
weapons systems. Finding that this is the general case in the market, where a mechanism exists
that creates wealth when DoD contracts delay could lead to changes in the system that allow
greater market regulation of DoD contracts.
The data indicate that the market response to the event was nearly identical in overall
wealth creation for both Boeing and Sikorsky. This observation indicates that shareholder
reaction to a government contract delay event is not necessarily company specific. This
observation also has an interesting point in that the wealth created over the 21 day observation
period, $19.2 million for Boeing and $19.7 million for United Technologies, was nearly
identical. This data is remarkable given the pre-event value difference of the two companies;
$485million for Boeing and $937 million for United Technologies. A possible explanation is that
this represents the true market value of the event.
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The period immediately prior to, and during the event period are devoid of extraneous
news events that would have impacted the stock price of either company. The absence of other
public information adds credence to the conclusion by not having to account for externalities that
may have influenced the results. Future research to generalize the study to the acquisition system
as whole may have significant issues establishing such clean events for other programs. Defense
industry consolidation has led to multiple programs managed by the same company. For
example, in the 2005 GAO Weapon Systems Review, Boeing is the contractor for 13 major
systems. Finding a delay event in which some other event from another program is not also in the
news is going to prove somewhat difficult. For companies with civilian sector work, the problem
is only going to increase. Future researchers will have to screen the events carefully and
replication of this research may not be possible on all programs in the DoD.
There is an observed reactionary delay of approximately five days by the market, based
on the news. There are several plausible explanations for the initial reaction. Boeing stock
reacted immediately negative to the news followed by a five day lull. United Technologies had
no significant reaction for 5 days. The initial negative reaction in Boeing stock could be
explained by corporate traders observing this as negative event for a company with a problematic
contract history. As the information spread through the broader market, both companies reacted
as the theory predicted and within 2 days of each other.
Follow up research
The study must be replicated on a larger scale to allow the conclusion that this is indeed
an issue that has impact on the acquisition system. Performing this same study on the list of 26
programs in the GAO Selected Weapons System Review would provide a more definitive
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assessment that the problem is systemic. Failure to support these findings would also have merit
as an indicator of an anomaly, specific to certain companies that do business within the DoD.
The continuation of this research should be approached in terms of defining the system,
identifying the mechanisms of that system and then understanding the implications of those
findings on acquisitions policy. Currently, acquisition reform and management regulation tends
to consider only those things that the government can regulate as part of the system. This
research has clearly shown that there are mechanisms at work that the government either not
aware of, or not considering when it attempts to improve the process.
Caution should be used in future research not to seek policy changes to lessen a perceived
profit. While it is possible that firms are managing to this phenomenon to bring wealth to their
shareholders, full understanding of that mechanism must be obtained before attempting to impact
it. Without understanding, the policy recommendations could have significant unwanted impacts.
Specific follow up research to identify the nature of the transmission mechanism should
be conducted to answer several questions that have been raised from this research. Identifying
why delay has value to the shareholders is a primary question that must be addressed.
Investigating the relationships between the magnitudes of the wealth generated to several readily
reported measures of corporate health would provide some indication of why delay has value.
Earnings on capital for the quarter and year in which the delay occurred could provide indication
that shareholder value delay to keep facilities and plants operating and not in a loss mode. The
tax implications of future government work may prove to be the reason for the increased wealth
observed. A valuation of the research and development to other programs, government and
civilian, should be identified to see if that has bearing on the wealth created. The broader study,
showing that delay creates wealth would be the stepping stone for gaining understanding.
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The previous recommendations may lead to an understanding of why the delay has value
to shareholders. To truly understand the system as a whole, understanding the value that delay
has for the DoD is crucial. This type of research provides less available comparative measure and
the researcher must determine how to measure value for the DoD. The DoD may be providing a
value to the nation in terms of future continued employment, cash flow to operations, and
research that no other customer can provide. The wealth created by a delay may represent the
market value of the government’s continuation at that point in time. The delay may also signal a
vote of confidence to the market for the firm in question. The value of the delay to the DoD must
be understood before policy recommendations can be made with full understanding of their
impact.
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